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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RUSSELL CAPSON and ) 
PEGGY CAPSON, his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Respondents, ) APPEAL BRIEF 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CLIFFORD M. BRISBOIS and ) Case No. 15746 
SHIRLEY G. BRISBOIS, his wife,) 
and TRACY REALTY COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Appellant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from an "Order Releasing Funds De-
posited With The Court" wherein the trial court denied 
Appellant's motion for costs and attorneys fees incurred 
in bringing the interpleader action pursuant to which the 
Order was issued. 
II. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court ordered, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion, 
that the fund deposited with the court by the Appellant be 
released to plaintiffs through their counsel. In so order-
ing the Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion for Costs and 
Attorney's Fees. 
-1-
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III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a ruling that it is entitled to cosb 
and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this interpleader 
action as a disinterested stakeholder, and that the case b; 
remanded to the Trial Court to award such costs and fees ~ 
the Appellant. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 3, 197 5, Russell Cap son and Peggy Cap son, his 
wife (hereinafter "Capson"), plaintiffs below, and Clifford 
Brisbois and Shirley G. Brisbois, his wife (hereinafter 
"Brisbois"), defendants below, entered into an Earnest~~ 
Agreement pursuant to which Brisbois agreed to purchase hoc 
Cap son a parcel of land in Sandy, Utah. ( R. 1) . A deposit 
in the amount of $1,000.00 was made with appellant Tracy 
Realty Company (hereinafter "Tracy Realty"), defendant 
below, as an earnest money deposit with respect to said 
Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 1). Subsequent events resuite: 
in a failure to consurnma te the Agreement to Purchase. (R. l 
On May 3, 1976, Russell Capson submitted to Tracy Realty a 
demand for the $1, 000. 00 earnest money deposit in connectior 
with the above-described transaction. (R. 2). On that same 
date, Tracy Realty wrote to Brisbois indicating that capsor. 
had made a demand for the earnest money deposit and indica· 
. th'' 
ting that Tracy Realty would comply with said request Wl ' 
ten (10) days unless it heard otherwise from Brisbois. (R.: 
-2-
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Subsequently, Tracy Realty was contacted by Shirley Brisbois 
who indicated that Tracy Realty was not to release the 
earnest money deposit. (R. 8). 
Thereafter, on or about August 2, 1976, Tracy Realty was 
served with a Summons and Complaint in this action. (R. 6). 
On August 23, 1976, Tracy Realty filed its Answer and counter-
claim and Crossclaim for Interpleader in this matter and 
deposited with the court below the $1,000.00 earnest money 
deposit claimed by Capson and Brisbois. (R. 7, 10, 11). 
On January 31, 1978, a judgment by default in the 
amount of $10,659.80 was entered against Brisbois. (R. 20). 
On that same date, Capson filed a Motion for Order Releasing 
Funds Deposited With The Court. (R. 21). Subsequently on 
February 7, 1978, Tracy Realty filed a Motion for Costs and 
Attorney's Fees and on February 9, 1978, filed an Affidavit 
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion. (R. 24, 26, 28). 
On February 10, 1978, argument with respect to Tracy 
Realty's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees was heard 
before Judge Dean E. Conder, District Judge, Third District 
Court for Salt Lake county, State of Utah. (R. 35). As a 
result of said hearing, Judge Conder issued an "Order 
Releasing Funds Deposited With The Court," dated February 21, 
1978, and an "Amended Order Releasing Funds Deposited With 
The Court and Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint as to Defen-
dant Tracy Realty Company," dated March 23, 1978. (R. 37, 
4 8) . 
-3-
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In both the Order and Amended Order, Judge Conder 
denied appellant's request for costs and attorney's fees 
incurred incident to depositing the funds into court pur-
suant to the interpleader action. (R. 37, 48). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case appears to be one of first impression before 
this court. As noted in the Statement of Facts, in the 
court below, Appellant, Tracy Realty Company (Tracy Realty) 
interpleaded certain parties to an earnest money agreement 
for the purpose of determining rights in an earnest money 
deposit which Tracy Realty held as a disinterested stake-
holder. Tracy Realty incurred costs and attorney's fees as 
a result of the interpleader action and sought to recover 
the same upon judgment of the case. (R. 26). Tracy Realty's 
motion to this effect was denied by the trial court on the 
ground that costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable u 
the absence of statute or contract providing therefore. 
The issues presented for determination by this Court 
are whether the trial court has equitable power to grant 
attorney's fees and costs to Appellant, Tracy Realty; 
whether the court below abused its discretion in denying 
costs and attorney's fees to Appellant; and whether such 
costs and attorney's fee are recoverable out of the fund 
deposited by Appellant with the lower court. 
-4-
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B. APPELLANT, TRACY REALTY, IS ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS UNDER THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE 
OF "COMMON FUND." 
1. The "Common Fund Doctrine" Is A 
Recognized Exception To The "No-
Attorney-Fees Rule." 
Under common law there are no provisions for attorney's 
fees and costs. Thus, many jurisdictions hold that in the 
absence of statute or contract providing therefore, attar-
ney's fees and costs will not be awarded, and each party 
will be required to bear his own expenses. Cluff v. Culmer, 
556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976); B & R Supply Company v. Bringhurst, 
28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake v. Blake, 17 
Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966). 
However, there is a recognized exception to the no-
attorney-fees rule known as the equitable "common fund" doc-
trine. This rule states that a court of equity is deemed to 
have powers to award costs and counsel fees in its discre-
tion, in an appropriate situation, and may properly do so 
where a party has, at his own expense, maintained a sue-
cessful suit for the preservation, protection, or increase 
of a common fund or, at his own expense, has created or 
brought into court a fund in which others may share. 
Buford v. Tobacco Growers Co-op Association, 42 F.2d 791, 
792 (4th Cir. 1930). The rationale behind this exception is 
that awarding costs and attorney's fees out of a fund depo-
sited with the court is not awarding such costs and fees in 
the traditional sense. "The theory, among others, is that 
-5-
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the party reimbursed has acted as a trustee in the ~ 
interest. Gold Dust Corporation v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 45!, 
453 (2nd Cir. 1937) (emphasis in text). In an interpleader 
action the party bringing the suit and depositing the funds 
into the court as a disinterested stakeholder is in a real 
sense a trustee for the cornrnrnon interest, and thus qualifies 
to be reimbursed as such for its expenses. The reimburse-
ment cannot be correctly categorized as "awarding costs,• u 
costs properly signify payment by an adverse party, Id., and 
the parties to an interpleader cannot by definition be 
adverse to a disinterested stakeholder. 
Thus it was held in Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796. 
557 p. 2d 342 (1976): 
A court may also award attorney's 
fees if a party meets the require-
ments of the common fund exception 
to the no-attorney-fees rule. We 
have applied this exception in cases 
where the litigant created or pre-
served a specific fund for the 
benefit of others, as well as the 
litigant. (Citations omitted). 
Id. at 344. 
In Estate of Johnson, 27 Or. App. 46L 556 P,2d 969, 
(1976), the Washington Supreme Court outlined the exception 
as follows: 
When a fund is brought into the court 
through the services of an attorney or 
where his services have added to or . 
preserved or increased the amount being 
administered, the court of primary 
jurisdiction may properly allow a 
reasonable compensation for his services 
to be paid from the fund. 
Id. at 971. 
~~--------------6----------~ 
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Thus, where a disinterested stakeholder deposits a 
fund with a court of equity pursuant to an interpleader 
action, and does not become an adverse party to the action 
the court may properly award attorney's fees and costs to 
the disinterested stakeholder. The Utah no-attorney-fees 
rule referred to above is not inconsistent with this 
equitable exception. The cases cited above which support 
the no-attorney-fees rule all involved adversary proceed-
ings in law, wherein the party seeking reimbursement for 
attorney's fees and costs was an adverse party. Cluff v. 
Culmer, supra., at 499 (attorney's fees sought in bringing 
suit on defaulted contract); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 
supra., at 1217 (attorney's fees sought on rescission of 
contract); Blake v. Blake, supra., at 456 (attorney's 
fees sought in action to avoid sales agreement and warranty 
deed) . The present case does not involve an adversary pro-
ceeding at law, but rather a non-adversary proceeding in 
equity. In this regard Utah law is presently unclear as 
to whether attorney's fees and costs may properly be 
awarded under the Utah interpleader statute. 
2. A Majority Of American Jurisdictions 
Including All Federal Courts Have 
Interpreted Their Interpleader Statutes 
To Allow Attorney's Fees And costs 
Under The Common Fund Doctrine. 
The Utah interpleader statute, Rule 22, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is identical to subsection (1) of the 
-7-
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federal interpleader statute, Rule 22, Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, (Subsection (2) deals solely with Federal 
jurisdiction) and like the federal statute, the Utah statu:, 
does not have a provision allowing for attorney's fees. ~~ 
withstanding the fact that there is no provision in the Sb~ 
ute for attorney's fees, all federal circuit courts have 
interpreted the federal statute so as to allow such fees ~ 
disinterested stakeholders. Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d 
462 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 911 (1962); A/S 
Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 
1962); Callwood v. Virgin Islands National Bank, 221 F.2d 
770 (3d Cir. 1955); Board of Educacion of Raleigh Coun~ v. 
Winding Gulf Collieries, 152 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1946); Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Oliver, 412 F. 2d 938 (5th Cir. 1969); Mutual :i' 
Ins. co. v. Bondurant, 27 F2d. 646 (6th Cir. 1928); John 
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Beardslee, 216 F.2d 457 17th 
Cir. 1954) cert. den. 348 U.S. 964, (1954); NewYorkLifeb 
co. v. Miller, 139 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1944); Schirmer Steve· 
daring Co., Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d i8i 
(9th Cir. 1962); Home Ins. co. v. Burns, 474 F.2d 1001 (9tr. 
Cir. 1973); United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, 525 
F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Likewise most state courts have held that attorney's 
fees and costs are allowable in interpleader actions. 
following states have statutes similar to the Federal 
-8-
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and Utah rules and have interpreted their statutes in accor-
dance with the common fund doctrine, allowing attorney's 
fees and costs: Colorado (CRCP Rule 22), Liebhart v. Avison, 
123 Colo. 338, 229 P.2d 933 (1951); Delaware (DCA Rule 22), 
Everitt v. Everitt, 146 A.2d 338 (Del. 1958); Florida (FRCP 
1.240), Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 so.2d 519 
(1941); Hawaii (HRS 634-11), Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. 
Von Hansen-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288, Reh. Den. 34 Hawaii 316 
(1937); Illinois (Ill. A.S. 110-26.2), Fireman's Ins. Co. of 
Newark, New Jersey v. Newell, 10 Ill. App. 2d 371, 135 N.E.2d 
116 (1956); Maine (MRCP 22), First National Bank v. Reynolds, 
127 Me. 340, 143 A. 266, 60 A.L.R. 712 (1928); Maryland (B.U. 
70-74), Maulsby v. Scarborough, 179 Md. 67, 16 A.2d 897 (1940); 
Massachusetts (MCR 22) Mason v. Taylor, 351 Mass. 347, 221 
N.E.2d 400 (1966); Michigan (MSA 19.7603), Star Transfer Line 
v. General Exporting Co, 308 Mich. 86, 13 N.W.2d 217, Cert. 
Den. 323 U.S. 724 (1944); Mississippi (MCA(l972) 11-35-41, 
il-35-43), Gayden v. Kirk, 44 So.2d 410 (Miss. 1950); Missouri 
(AMS 507.060), John A. Moore & Co. v. Mcconkey, 240 Mo. App. 
198, 203 S.W.2d 512 (1947); Montana (MRCP 22), First National 
Bank of Circle v. Garner, 567 P.2d 40 (Mont. 1977); Nevada 
(NRCP 22), Mooney v. Newton, 43 Nev. 441, 187 P. 721 (1920); 
New Jersey (NJSA 48: 20-24), Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. 
v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960); New Mexico (NMS 
(1953) 21-1-1 (22)}, Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of 
-9-
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Wisconsin v. Jarde, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382 (1963); New 
York (CPLR 1006), Bank of America v. Transpollux carriers 
Corp., 26 Misc.2d 524, 204 N.Y. S.2d 962 (1960); Oklahoma 
(OSA 12 Section 238), Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.~ 
521 (Okla. 1964); Oregon (ORS 13.120), Gresham State Bank 
v. 0. K. Construction Co., 370 P.2d 726 (Or. 1962); Texas 
(West's Texas Rules Ann. CP 43), Suiter v. Gregory, 279 
S.W. 2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Washington (RCWA 4.08.15: 
Hsu Ying Liv. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796, 557 P.2d 342 (1976), 
While the interpleader statutes of California and New 
Hampshire vary significantly from the federal statute they 
are, nevertheless, similar in that neither specifically 
provides for attorney's fees. Like the courts indicated 
above, the courts of these states have also interpreted 
their statutes to allow for recovery of attorney's fees a~ 
costs. Cali!:ornia (CCP 386, 389.5), Fritschi v. Teed, 213 
Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1963); New Hampshire 
(NHCH 334: 21), Manchester Federal Savings & Loan v. Emery 
Waterhouse Co., 153 A.2d 918 (N.H. 1959). 
A number of state jurisdictions provide for attorney's 
fees by statute; Alabama (ARCP 22); Connecticut (GSC 
(Revised) 451-484); Georgia (GCA 37-1503); Idaho (IC 5-
321); Louisiana (LSA 4659); Pennsylvania (PPCSA §2503); 
Virginia (VC §8, 01-573); West Virginia (INC 56-10-1) · some 
of these states allowed for attorney's fees in interple~N 
-10-
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actions prior to legislation specifically providing there-
fore. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F2d. 126 
(D.C. Idaho 1926); Edwards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. co., 
215 Pa. Super. 390, 259 A.2d 183 (1969); Pettus v. Hendricks, 
113 Va. 326, 74 S.E. 191 (1912); Union Mutual Life Ins. co. 
v. Linda Mood, 108 W.Va. 594, 152 S.E. 321 (1930). 
There can be no doubt that the common fund doctrine is 
a majority rule in the United States. At least thirty 
states and all federal courts follow this doctrine. On the 
basis of this authority, this Court should adopt the common 
fund doctrine as it applies to interpleader actions and 
award attorney's fees and costs to appellant in the present 
action. 
3. Utah Law Is Impliedly Similar To Case 
Law In Sister Jurisdictions Which Have 
Adopted The Common Fund Doctrine. 
Utah cases have not directly ruled upon the availability of 
costs and attorney's fees in interpleader actions; however, 
in Xaycock v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 
179 (1932), this Court, after discussing the dilatory tactics 
of a plaintiff insurance company in an interpleader action, 
stated: 
The insurance company owed a duty to 
the claimants of the fund . . . to 
promptly pay the money into court 
and withdraw from the litigation. 
The failure of the insurance company 
to perform such duty precludes it 
from the recovery of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in the 
trial of this cause . . . · 
79 l.ita:-i at 255. 
-11-
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The obvious corollary to the Maycock case is that, had 
the insurance company acted promptly and in good faith, lb 
costs and attorney's fees would have been granted. 
Thus pursuant to the Maycock rationale and the great 
weight of authority from sister jurisdictions, this court 
should follow the majority rule and hold that attorney's fee; 
and costs are allowable to a disinterested stakeholder in a 
proper interpleader action. 
C. APPELLANT, TRACY REALTY, QUALIFIES AS 
A DISINTERESTED STAKEHOLDER ELIGIBLE 
FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS UNDER THE "COMMON FUND DOC-
TINE," AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING SAID COSTS 
AHD ATTORNNEY'S FEES. 
1. Appellant Qualifies As A Dis-
interested Stakeholder. 
The criteria for determining whether a party bringing 
a fund into court as a disinterested stakeholder is quali-
fied to receive costs and attorney's fees under the common 
fund doctrine, is well set out in Niedermyer v. Fehl, 153 
or. 656, 57 P.2d 1086 (1936) as follows: 
Plaintiff claims no interest in the fund 
involved. It appears that it is now and has 
been since it offered to tender money into cour~, willing at all times to pay the fund 
involved to whomever it rightfully belongs, 
as soon as the plaintiff could safely do so. 
Its acts . . . have been at all times free 
and above board. 
Id. at 1090. See also Gresham State Bank v. O.K. Con-
str'-lction Co., 372 P.2d 187 (Or. 1962) · 
-12- ,.. 
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It is clear that appellant, Tracy Realty, has met all 
of the requirements set forth in Niedermyer, qualifying it 
for an award of costs and attorney's fees in the present 
case. Appellant first received formal notice of Capson's 
claim to the deposited funds on May 3, 1976 and immediately 
sought to notify Brisbois of said claim so as to resolve 
the question of which party should receive the earnest 
money deposited. (R. 8). Appellant first received notice 
of the claim of Brisbois sometime thereafter, but prior to 
June 17, 1976. Appellant was served with a Summons and 
Complaint in this matter on August 2, 1976, and filed its 
Answer and Crossclaim and Counterclaim for Interpleader on 
August 23, 1976. Appellant has at no time claimed or 
expressed any interest in the earnest money deposited with 
the court, and has been willing at all times to pay said 
deposit over to the party to whom it rightfully belongs. 
Further, Appellant has been neither dilatory nor obstre-
perous with respect to the prosecution of this cause of 
action. As set forth in the affidavit contained in the 
Record at pages 26-27, as a result of the action in the 
court below, the attorneys for Tracy Realty have rendered 
services and incurred costs on behalf of said Appellant 
with a reasonable value of $385.00 and should be com-
pensated therefore. 
-13-
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2. Limitations On The Common Fund 
Doctrine Do Not Apply To The 
Appellant In The Present Case. 
There are four recognized limitations placed on t~ 
recovery of attorney's fees and costs in interpleader 
actions: 
(1) Attorneys fees will be disallowed when an 
attorney or his client is an active or 
adverse party in the litigation, thus 
jeopardizing the beneficial use of the fund 
by others (as when the liability of the 
plaintiff or the amount of fund is in 
dispute). Maycock v. Continental Life 
Insurance Company, 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 
(1932) . 
(2) Attorneys fees will be disallowed where an 
attorney or his client unreasonably delays 
bringing the fund into court. Id. 
(3) Attorneys fees will be disallowed when the 
interpleader action is unwarranted. American 
United Life Insurance Company v. Luckman, 
21 F.Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1937). 
(4) Attorneys fees will be disallowed where the 
interpleader action is necessitated by the 
fault of the plaintiff seeking attorneys 
fees. Gresham State Bank v. 0. K. Construc-
tion Co., 370 P.2d 726 (Or. 1962). 
None of these specific limitations apply to appell~t 
Tracy Realty in the present case. First, the appellant is 
not an active or adverse party in the litigation, it has 
not disputed the amount of funds so deposited and has not 
jeopardized the beneficial use of fund by the parties 
entitled thereto. Second, the appellant acted reasonab~ 
and in due haste in bringing the contested fund into 
-14- .. 
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court, thereby avoiding any limitations regarding unrea-
sonable delay. Third, interpleader was clearly warranted 
in the present case pursuant to Rule 22, Utah Rules of 
civil Procedure, which provides for interpleader in actions 
in which the moving party may be exposed to multiple or 
double liability. It is clear in the present case that 
had the appellant not brought the interpleader action it 
may have been liable to either Capson or Brisbois or 
both, since the appellant held funds to which each party 
claimed a dominant interest. By depositing the fund with 
the court, appellant avoided this exposure to double or 
multiple liability as provided for in Rule 22. Thus, 
interpleader was warranted in the present case, and any 
limitation in this regard is not applicable to the appel-
lant. Fourth, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
appellant in any way caused the circumstances underlying 
the bringing of the present action. Indeed, the record is 
clear that the appellant at all times stood as a disinterested 
stakeholder awaiting the outcome of adverse claims to the 
fund. 
3. The Trial Court Abused Its Dis-
cretion In Not Awarding Costs 
And Attorney's Fees To The 
Appellant. 
The foregoing limitations being inapplicable to Tracy 
Realty, said appellant qualifies under the common fund 
rule, and therefore it was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion to deny the costs and attorney's fees incurred 
-1~-
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in the action as prayed for by said appellant. ~ 
Indemnity Company v. Puget Sound Company, Inc., 154 p. 2d 
249 (2nd Cir. 1946). 
Globe Indemnity, supra, involved the question of 
whether a qualified disinterested stakeholder could recover 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in depositing a contest;: 
fund into court. In that case the court held that "(t]he 
rules as to costs and attorney's fees in an interpleader 
action brought under the federal statute [Rule 22, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure] are no different than those that 
prevail in an ordinary equity interpleader." Id. at 250. 
The court went on to point out that in ordinary equity 
interpleaders the "usual practice" is to allow a disinter· 
ested stakeholder reimbursement of costs and attorney's f;;• 
necessitated by the interpleader. The court held that wt,:.· 
the granting of attorney's fees is within the discretioo~ 
the trial court, " . it is a discretion, which in the at· 
sence of special circumstances, should be exercised in 
accordance with the 'usual practice'." Id. at 250, 251. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is in accord. U 
United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, 525 F.2d 472 
(10th Cir. 1975), an action by a surety to determine right' 
in a subcontractor's fund, the court held that it is the 
· d · · terested 
"•.isual" practi::::e to allow reimbursement to a isin · 
stakeholder of costs and attorney's fees incident to bring-
b · · to the ing the funds into court, and that any o Jection 
-16-
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granting of the fee by one who benefited by the funds being 
brought into court is "frivolous". Id. at 471. 
This same rule adheres in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals which has stated: "We think that the proper rule, 
in an action in the nature of interpleader, is that the 
plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees for the services 
of his attorneys in interpleading." Schirmer Stevedoring co., 
Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th 
Cir. 1962). 
In the present case, the trial court did not follow 
the "usual practice," but rather denied costs and attorney's 
fees to a qualified disinterested stakeholder on the basis 
of Utah's no-attorney-fees rule to which the common fund 
doctrine stands as a recognized exception. Thus, either 
the trial court erroneously failed to recognize its power to 
grant fees under the common fund doctrine, or it abused its 
discretion in not allowing costs and fees in light of the 
facts of the present case. 
D. THE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
BY APPELLANT TRACY REALTY SHOULD BE 
AWARDED OUT OF THE FUND DEPOSITED WITH 
THE COURT IN THIS MATTER. 
While Utah law does not indicate from whence the award 
of attorney's fees and costs should come, courts in other 
jurisdictions have made it clear that such fees and costs 
should be paid out of the fund deposited with the court. 
Thus, we read in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 
F.2d 126 (D.C. Idaho 1926): 
-17-
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Apart from this statute [federal inter-
pleader statute] the weight of authority 
would seem ~o support the view that an 
interpleading plaintiff may be allowed his 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fee, 
out of the funds deposited with the court 
(citations omitted). 
In United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, supra, 
the court ruled that "ordinarily a fund so deposited [in 
an interpleader action] is chargeable with the reasonable 
fees incurred. See Moore's Federal Practice, 1122 .16 (a! 
U.S. v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862, 870, 871 (10th Cir. 1960)." 
Id. at 475. See also Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 
242 F.Supp. 680 (D.Maryland 1965), wherein the court award;: 
the interpleading life insurance company its costs and 
attorney's fees out of the funds deposited with the court 
where the widow and a son of a deceased insured claimed 
the proceeds of his life insurance policy. 
In Home Ins. Co. v. Burns, 474 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.19;; 
a case involving insurance proceeds payable to a bankrupt 
insured, the court specifically stated that any attorney's 
fees incurred by the insurance company in depositing the 
fund and in terpleading the parties should be removed from 
the deposited fund prior to the fund being deposited wiD 
the bankruptcy court. Id. at 1002. 
Thus, it is clear that the weight of authority favors 
granting reasonable costs and attorney's fees out of the 
fund deposited with t:-ie court. Appellant, Tracy RealtY• 
'.laving fulfilled t'."le requiremer.ts of a disi:-iterested 
-18-
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stakeholder is therefore entitled to be reimbursed from 
the deposited fund. 
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARISING OUT 
OF EQUITY WARRANT AN ALLOWANCE OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN INTER-
PLEADER ACTIONS. 
In the present case, Appellant, Tracy Realty, suffered 
a wrong in that pursuant to an interpleader action in which 
Appellant remained a disinterested stakeholder and by its 
efforts to preserve a fund for those who claimed it, it incur-
red expenses and attorney's fees for which the law does not 
provide recompense. The maxim in equity that "equity will 
not permit a wrong to be suffered without a remedy" is most 
applicable here. As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court: 
Equity is reluctant to permit a wrong to 
be suffered without a remedy. It seeks to 
do justice and is not bound by strict com-
mon law rules or the absence of precedents. 
It looks to the substance rather than the 
form. It will not sanction an unconscion-
able result merely because it may have 
been brought about by means which simulate 
legality. And once rightfully possessed 
of the case it will not relinquish it 
short of doing complete justice. 
Sanders v. Folsom, 451 P.2d 612, 618 (Ariz. 1969). 
Without recompense for costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in a successful attempt to preserve a contested 
fund until the rights of adverse parties can be deter-
mined, "complete justice" cannot be done to the appellant. 
It is inequitable to require a disinterested stake-
holder at the risk of otherwise facing multiple liabilities 
-19-
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to deposit funds for the benefit of others without compensa-
tion for expenses incurred in doing so. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: 
"The [Common Fund] rule rests upon the 
ground that where one litigant has borne 
the burden and expense of the ligitation 
that has inured to the benefit of others 
as well as to himself, those who have 
shared in the benefits should contribute 
to the expense." 
Fisher v. Superior Oil, 390 P. 2d 521, 523 (Okla. 1964). 
If this court adopts a rule denying attorney's fees~ 
disinterested stakeholders in interpleader actions it will 
doubtless have the effect of chilling interpleader actions 
generally. The practice of interpleading parties effect-
uates the important policy of judicial economy by avoidi~ 
duplicity or multplicity of actions. A denial of costs and 
fees to a disinterested stakeholder bringing an interpleader 
action will chill the moving party's desire to combine the 
actions through interpleader and will, in the long run, leac 
to a substantially increased number of separate actions 
which should have been combined. Not only will the dis-
interested party be harmed thereby, but the court system 
will suffer. Such long range effects of a denial of costs 
and attorney's fees should be avoided. 
Thus, the policy underlying both equity generally and 
the common fund doctrine specifically weighs heavily in 
favor of granting attorney's fees and costs in interpleader 
actions. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The equitable "common fund doctrine" stands as an 
exception to the common law "no-attorney-fees rule". This 
exception is recognized by a majority of state courts, by 
all federal courts, and is consistent with case law and 
statutory law of Utah. 
Appellant, Tracy Realty, qualifies as a disinterested 
stakeholder and therefore is entitled to be compensated for 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in depositing a fund 
into court and determining the rights of parties claiming 
an interest therein. The denial of costs and attorney's 
fees in the present case was an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court. 
Since bringing the fund into court benefits the adverse 
parties to the action, it is well settled that reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs should be taken from that fund. 
Policy considerations underlying equity generally and 
the common fund doctrine specifically mandate the granting 
of attorney's fees and costs to the appellant. 
For the reasons above stated, Appellant, Tracy Realty, 
prays that the Order of the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County, state of Utah, denying attorney's fees and 
costs to the Appellant be reversed and that the case be 
remanded directing payment of said costs and fees to the 
Appellant from the fund deposited with the Court in the 
amount of $385.00. 
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/\ DATED this :;3~ day of May, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-----t1/----
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
oregoing APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT was personally served 
upon Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., Attorney for Respondents, 
at his office in the Metropolitan Law Building, Second 
Floor, 431 South Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
this ~day of May, 1978. 
~N~ 
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON 
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